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ADVANCING COMPETITION POLICY IN THE
LEGISLATIVE ARENA- FLORIDA'S EXPERIENCE
IN SUNSET REVIEW OF SURFACE
TRANSPORATION REGULATION
CHARLE R. RANSON*
GEORGE H. SHELDON**

There must be power in the states ...

to remould, through experi-

mentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing
social and economic needs ....

To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with

serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.... If we would guide by the light

of reason, we must let our minds be bold.1

INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 1980 economic regulation of surface transportation in Florida
was dismantled by the operation of the Regulatory Reform Act.2 After nearly
fifty-one years of expansive governmental regulation, delivery and consumption
of intrastate transportation services were returned to a competitive market environment, subject only to reestablished safety regulation 3 and federal and
state antitrust and trade regulation. 4 In allowing economic regulation of surface transportation to expire, Florida became the first state to take such action. 5
The legislative history of this unprecedented decision is the subject of this
article, which reflects the authors' vantage point by focusing on the deliberations of the House Committee on Regulatory Reform. 6 First, the operation of
the Regulatory Reform Act, commonly referred to as sunset review, will be explained. Then, the various issues that arose in first considering deregulation of
surface transportation are identified. Finally, the substance and consequence of
*B.A., Florida Presbyterian College (now Eckerd College), 1969; J.D., Florida State University, 1973; member, Florida Bar and D.C. Bar.
**B.A., Florida State University, 1969; J.D., Florida State University, 1978; member
Florida Bar.
I. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1936) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. FIA. STAT. §11.61 (1979) (originally enacted in 1976, 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-167, and
amended by 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-45).
3. 1980 Fla. Laws, ch. 80-298 (reestablished safety regulation under the Florida Department of Transportation).
4. FLA. STAT. §§501.201-.213,-540.01-.11, 542.01-.36 (1979).
5. Prior to Florida's action only New Jersey and Delaware did not pervasively regulate
surface transportation.
6. The authors were Chairman and Director of the House Committee on Regulatory Reform.
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the legislative debate on these issues are described, both with respect to passenger transportation and trucking.
SUNSET LAW - THE VEHICLE OF CHANGE

Early populism found expression in the adoption of antitrust laws, first at
the state level,? then at the federal level.8 Antitrust laws were designed to limit
concentrations of economic power that could be used abusively to disrupt operation of free and competitive markets. A century later, a wave of resurgent
populism resulted in the states reasserting their long-abrogated antitrust enforcement responsibility.
This new surge of populism also prompted the adoption of sunset laws,
which focus on combating entrenched economic power existing by virtue of
government regulation. Clearly evident in the fashioning of this new tool for
encouraging a competitive marketplace was the recognition that government
regulation may ultimately confound rather than promote the purpose for which
it was established.
Passage of Florida's sunset law, the Regulatory Reform Act, occurred in
1976. 9 The enactment of Florida's sunset law was predated only by the Colorado
legislature's passage of a similar statute. By early 1980, however, a total of
thirty-four states had adopted the sunset concept. 10 Of these states, all but two
adopted the "true" sunset approach, 1 which requires affirmative legislative

7. At least thirteen states or territories had enacted antitrust laws prior to passage of the
Sherman Act in 1890. See H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGIN OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 155 (1955); Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. FLA. L.
REV. 653, 657-61 (1974).
8. See, e.g., Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§1-6, 8, 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §1 (1976)); Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, §5, 38 Stat. ch. 719 (current version
at 15 U.S.C. §§41-77 (1976); Clayton Act, ch. 323, §7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at

15 U.S.C. §§12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§52-53 (1976)).
9. 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-167 (codified at FLA. STAT. §11.61 (1979)).
10. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§41-20-1 to -16 (Supp. 1980); ALASKA STAT. §§44.66.010-.060
(1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§41-2351 to 41-2354, 41-2361 to -2379 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§5-1201 to -1212 (Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. §24-34-104 (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§2C-1 to -12 (Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §10202 (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. §11.61
(1979); GA. CODE §§84-1016 to -1106 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§26H-1 to -7 (Supp. 1977);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §§1951-1957 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. §§4-26-3-10 to
-30 (Burns Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§74-7201 to -7242 (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§49:190-199 (West Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§501-511 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 41, §§484-489 (Supp. 1980); Miss. CODE ANN. §§5-9-1 to -35 (Supp. 1980); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §82-4601 to -4609 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§81-192 to -1,105 (1978); NEV.
REV. STAT. tit. 18, §§1-7 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §17(g) (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§12-9-1 to -10 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§143-34.10 to -34.21 (Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 74, §§3901-3919 (West Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§182.605-.635 (1977); R.I. GENi. LAws
§§22-14-1 to -14 (1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§1-26B-1 to -12 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§4-2903 to -2924 (Supp. 1979); TFx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5429K (Vernon Supp. 1980);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§63-55-2, -7 (Supp. 1979): VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§3101-3105 (1978); VA.
CODE tit. 30, §§64-73 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§43-131.010-.900 (Supp. 1981); W. VA.
CODE §§4-10-1 to -14 (Supp. 1980); WYO. STAT. §§28-10-101 to -103 (Supp. 1980).
11. The "quasi-sunset laws" of Alabama (ALA. CODE tit. 41, §20(1)-(16) (1980)) and Vir-
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action to continue regulation beyond a certain date. In their varying forms,
these sunset laws provide for systematic assessment of government regulatory
mechanisms to determine the degree to which such regulation serves the public,
as opposed to the private, interest.
An additional impetus to enactment of sunset laws was the substantial decline of confidence in the effectiveness of government. Louis Harris, the noted
12
pollster, described this phenomenon as a "full-blown crisis of confidence."'
Seventy-six percent of the American public believed the "elected officials have
lost control over bureaucrats who really run things." 13 The public felt that
bureaucratic agencies and, ultimately, elected officials were non-responsive and
non-accountable.
Commentators have described the evolution of administrative bureaucracy
as encompassing three distinct stages.1 4 This life cycle, which rapidly progresses
from early to later states, includes:
(1) the young years, characterized by vigorous regulation for the public's protection (regulation by regulators);
(2) maturity, where unbiased public protection wanes under increasing
influence on the regulators by the regulated (regulation jointly by
the regulators and the regulated); and
(3) old age, where influence by the regulated over the regulators develops into control (regulation by the regulated).a
This capture theory of regulation represents a recent and widely articulated philosophy.Y1 Writers do not attribute this transformation to a corrupt
motive, but rather to the excessive interaction between the regulated and the
regulators that is spurred by revolving-door interchange of personnel between
the regulatory agency and regulated industry.17 The ultimate result of this
interaction blurs the distinction between public and private interests. Where
the distinction becomes blurred, regulation often protects the interests of the
regulated industry by limiting competition, allocating markets, and maintaining pricing and profitability within an industry.18 Implementation of sunset
laws, and the analysis attendant thereto, provides a means to gauge the extent
to which regulatory functions and agencies have succumbed to control of the
regulated.
Florida's Regulatory Reform Act provided guidelines to conduct this review
and criteria to be satisfied as a prerequisite to reestablishment or reform of
ginia (VA. CODE tit. 30 §§64-73 (1978)) provide for mandatory review but do not include
automatic termination.
12. Hearing on a Survey of Public Attitudes Before the Subcommittee on Government
Operations,93rd Congress, ist Session 7 (1973) (statement of Louis Harris).
13. Id.
14. See Price, Sunset Legislationin the United States, 80 BAYLOR L. REv. 401 (1978).
15. Id. at 402 nA.
16. Id.
17. See J. BURNS, J. PELAToN, & T.

CRONIN,

GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 480 (9th ed.

1975).
18. See Price, supra note 14, at 409 n.48 (in 1973, of 2149 applicants sitting for the
licensing examination of the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board, none passed).
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scheduled regulatory programs. 19 Although these guidelines or criteria cannot
bind a subsequent legislature, 20 they illuminate the intent of the enacting legislature and have provided significant assistance to ensuing legislatures and legislative committees engaged in sunset review.
On the House of Representatives side of the Florida legislature, the Committee on Regulatory Reform was established to conduct an initial review of
most regulatory schemes scheduled for Regulatory Reform Act scrutiny, and to
submit recommendations for action to the full House. The committee adopted
guidelines for regulatory reform. These guidelines governed the committee's
consideration and provided a complete understanding of the burden of proof
necessary to reenact regulation. The ten statements comprising the committee's
guidelines indicated a clear preference for the minimal governmental interference with free markets that is consistent with the state's police power responsibility. The guidelines were based on a recognition that government cannot protect all people from all things, and stated that:
I. A free market, where consumers make rational and informed choices
about the purchase of goods and services, is the most efficient form of regulation.
II. Government should regulate free markets only when it is demonstrated
that:
1. The nature of the good or service to be purchased renders it difficult for
the consumer to make an informed choice, and
2. The consequences of a wrong choice endanger the consumer's health or
safety.
III. When it is demonstrated that regulation is necessary, the least restrictive alternative should be explored first.
IV. Where requirements for entry into an occupation are necessary, those
requirements should be clearly related to safe and effective practices.
V. Every out-of-state or immigrant licensee or applicant should have fair
and reasonable access to the licensing process.
VI. Where entry into an occupation is restricted through licensing, renewal
of a license should be based on evidence of continued practitioner competency.
VII. Decisions concerning initial licensure, discipline, and license renewal
should be made fairly and expeditiously with due process protections guaranteed to both applicants and licensees.
VIII. The purpose of regulation is to protect the public, rather than the
economic interest of the regulated group.
IX. The public should be involved in the regulatory process. Representa19. In enacting the Regulatory Reform Act, 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-168, the Florida Legislature adopted the following criteria to guide evolution of existing programs: (1) Would the
absence of regulation significantly harm or endanger the public health, safety, or welfare? (2)
Is there a reasonable relationship between the exercise of the state's police power and the
protection of the public health, safety or welfare? (3) Is there another less xestrictive method
of regulation available which could adequately protect the public? (4) Does the regulation
have the affect of directly or indirectly increasing the costs of any goods or services involved,
and if so, to what degree? (5) Is the increase in cost more harmful to the public than the
harm which could result from the absence of regulation?Id. §5.
20. See Straughn v. Camp, 293 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1974); Gonzales v. Sullivan, 16 Fla. 791
(1878).
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tives of the public are capable, after hearing testimony, of deciding highly
technical questions related to regulated practice.
X. Governmental regulation should continue only as long as the need for
such regulation continues to exist. The legislature should periodically review
the regulation to ensure the conditions necessitating the regulation still apply.
This statement of principles represented a recognition by the Committee on

Regulatory Reform that consumers were competent to make and live with the
consequences of many more marketplace decisions than government had been

previously willing to countenance. This new confidence in the ability of the
taxpayer-consumer portends the foundation for renewed public confidence in
the ability of government to be accountable and responsive.
INITIAL LEGISLATIVE ACHON: DEFINING THE ISSUES

Legislative interest in surface transportation regulation initially appeared
several years prior to its scheduled review within the context of the Regulatory
Reform Act. As early as 1977, various members of the legislature attempted to
deal with the issue of trucking deregulation.21 Although considerable support
for deregulation was demonstrated, further discussion was postponed until the
next session. However, in 1978, several deregulation22 bills which were introduced died in the House Transportation Committee.
In 1979, the focus of the trucking deregulation effort shifted to the context
of sunset review. Coincidentally, a major redirection in the implementation of
the Regulatory Reform Act occurred, as legislative attention moved from professional and occupational regulation to, primarily, economic regulation. Prior
review was directed to examining regulation of rather isolated, dearly-identifiable disciplines, 23 which did not necessarily have pervasive impact on all seg21. In the waning days of the 1977 regular legislative session Representative Alan Becker
attempted to amend Senate Bill 1012. Representative Fred Jones, chairman of the Transportation Committee, commented on the floor that the amendment was the first step toward total
deregulation of the trucking industry in Florida. Representative Jones' comment brought a
cheer from the members of the house chamber and the amendment survived an attempt to
lay it on the table. Representative Jones then asked that the bill be temporarily passed. An
informal conference then took place between Speaker Donald Tucker, Speaker designate
Hyatt Brown, Representatives Jones, Sheldon and Becker as to the future of Senate Bill 1012.
During that informal conference an agreement was worked out that Speaker Tucker and
Representative Jones would commit the issue of regulatory reform of the ground transportation industry to a review in the 1978 legislative session. The amendment by Representative
Becker was then withdrawn and Senate Bill 1012 went on to the senate. This agreement was
brought to the attention of the floor and a commitment was made by Representative Jones
to study the possibility of deregulation in 1978.
22. Bills sponsored by Representatives Becker and Neal died in the Transportation Committee. Representative Jones did hold one legislative hearing lasting one day. During that
hearing presentations were made by Milton Kafoglis, Jack Pierce and Representative Sheldon
that deregulation carried merit and should be considered in more depth than a one day hearing. Following their testimony, the trucking industry presented witness after witness arguing
that any disruption of the current regulatory scheme would bring about chaos and reduction
of services to small communities.
23. In 1978, the first year in which sunset review was undertaken, the legislature reviewed
12 professional and occupational regulatory statutes, terminating four and substantially modi-
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ments of the population. The upcoming 1980 session of the legislature was
scheduled to conduct sunset review of economic regulation of electric utilities,
the telephone industry, water and sewer companies and surface transportation,
regulatory functions that had impact upon every Floridian.
The intrastate trucking industry had been regulated by the Public Service
Commission (PSC) pursuant to Florida Statutes chapter 323, which contained
the bulk of motor carrier regulation, and chapter 350, which empowered the
PSC to oversee regulation of the industry. The Committee on Regulatory Reform was assigned to conduct initial sunset review for the House of Representatives.24
In the minds of members of the committee were the words of Dr. Alfred E.
Kahn, spoken in his August 15, 1979 address before the American Bar Association. Kahn talked of the role of regulatory reform in an anti-inflation program
and addressed the .broad subject of the diffuse economic impact of pervasive
regulation. Speaking generally to the proposition that such regulation exerts
upward pressure on prices, Dr. Kahn stated:
The contribution of each one of these price-inflating policies to the
overall inflationary result will always seem small, hardly worth fighting
over; the people who are injured will ordinarily be widely dispersed, illorganized and ill-informed, and the stake of each in each policy and action will be small. In contrast, the beneficiaries will typically be few and
well organized, and the stake of each will be large.
That unequal confrontation, repeated on thousands of small, notvery-public issues is the essence of the ways in which government regulatory interventions contribute to inflation. Entering into these individual
confrontations, and tipping the balance on the side of the public interest
is the essential way of rooting it out.
The third year of implementation of the Regulatory Reform Act was, therefore, perceived as a pivotal year in gauging the viability of sunset review in
Florida as a means of stemming the inflationary tide, increasing governmental
accountability and forestalling introduction of more radical alternatives to
controlling the size and expense of government.
While the subject of review changed in 1980, the format remained essentially
fying eight. In 1979, three statutes were terminated and 23 were modified. See 1977 Fla. Laws,
ch. 77-457 (complete listing of review schedule). For analysis of legislative disposition, see the
final committee reports of the House of Representatives Committees on Governmental Operations (1978) and Regulatory Reform (1979).
24. Twenty-four regulatory programs were scheduled for review by the 1980 Legislature.
Based on the complexity of issues subject to sunset in 1980, Speaker J. Hyatt Brown chose to
refer to the House Committee on Commerce all issues related to banking and financial transactions. All other statutes scheduled for sunset review were referred to the Committee on
Regulatory Reform. Included in this list were: Chapter 320 (Motor Vehicle and Mobile Home
Dealers and Manufacturers), Chapter 323 (Motor Carriers), Chapter 364, Part II (Radio Common Carriers), Chapter 366 (Electric and Gas Utilities), Chapter 350 (Organization and
Powers of the Public Service Commission and Railroads), Chapter 367 (Water and Sewer),
Chapter 449 (Private Employment Agencies), Chapter 364 (Telephone and Telegraph),
Chapter 365 (Private Wire Services), Chapter 493 (Private Investigative Agencies) and Chapter
559, Part IV (Cemetary Regulation).
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unchanged. In the area of surface transportation regulation, as with all other
fourteen regulatory programs 2s reviewed by the Committee on Regulatory Reform in 1980, the initial task was to obtain a clear understanding of the underlying issues to the debate and of the provisions of existing law. Additionally,
the committee examined the manner in which the PSC interpreted and applied
that law.
By definition, surface transportation included both passenger bus service
(and attendant under-body cargo movement) and trucking services. It is important to note, however, that not all intrastate motor carriers in Florida were
regulated by the state. Rather, the extent and form of regulation applied depended on a carrier's classification as one of four types of intrastate motor carriers: common, contract, permit or exempt. Common carriers transported passengers or freight for the general public and were subject to extensive entry,
rate, and safety regulation by the PSC. Contract carriers, as the name implies,
only served specified customers pursuant to contracts between the carrier and
his customers. Such contracts had to be approved by the PSG and could be
modified or rejected. Permit carriers included carrier work exclusively under
contract for the federal government, carriers transporting unprocessed agricultural commodities, carriers moving houses and buildings, and carriers providing transportation services incidental to a primary business of maintenance,
repair, or installation of the transported goods. Permit carriers received operating authority as a matter of right upon application and payment of a $100 fee,
although the PSC did examine the proposed operation to ensure its classification within the permit class.
Exempt carriers were not regulated by the state except for safety, registration and insurance requirements generally applicable to all motor vehicles.
The largest part of this unregulated sector was composed of private carriers.
These are carriers that transport their own goods in their own trucks. Another
sizable portion of the unregulated trucking industry was composed of carriers
hauling only exempt items. Particular commodities, for example unprocessed
agricultural produce, could be hauled at any rate without interference from
the PSC.
In fact, over four-fifths of the trucking in Florida was not under certificate
from the PSC. The PSC estimated that fifty percent of the trucks on Florida's
highways were exempt from their regulation, thirty percent were under the
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and only the remaining
twenty percent were subject to state regulation as a common, contract or permit
carrier.
Based upon analysis of the extant regulatory framework,26 the staff of the
Committee on Regulatory Reform devised a detailed and comprehensive questionnaire designed to elicit operational and enforcement data from the PSC.
Additionally, during the summer of 1979, a report was commissioned by the
committee and prepared by the Florida State University Department of Public
Administration entitled "Florida's Regulation of Surface Transportation: A
25. See note 24 supra.
26.

See FiA. STAT. §§323.01-.68; 8 FiA. ADMiN. CODE 25-5.01 to
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Study of Issues." By design, the department's report to the committee contained
no recommendations or conclusions. Every effort was made to avoid language
2
and data which made inferences beyond being descriptive and informaive. 7
While committee staff organized data and conducted research in preparation for the committee hearings, the PSC,with the concurrence of the legislative leadership, undertook a summer-long series of public hearings throughout
the state. The purpose for these hearings was to elicit public and regulatedinterest comment concerning the various areas within their regulatory authority
subject to upcoming review.28 This agency action in preparation for participation in the legislative process markedly simplified the task of the Committee on
Regulatory Reform, since it enabled the PSC to be responsive to committee
inquiries. Subsequently, the PSC prepared draft legislation for the reform of
surface transportation regulation.
This proposal of the PSC, released in mid-November 1979, soon became
popularly known as the "re-regulation proposal." While the PSC suggested
areas of reform and the easing of various restrictions, its proposition was predicated on the assumption that continued regulation would inevitably follow
legislative review. It is doubtful that the PSC seriously considered the essential
question: was regulation necessary? This approach distinctly contrasted the
"zero-based" regulatory philosophy of the committee. 29 The "zero-based" approach to regulation, formalized by established guidelines and criteria, enabled
the committee to question whether the public welfare required any regulation
of surface transportation.
While the PSC conducted hearings and formulated proposals relative to
surface transportation regulation, various members of the Committee on Regulatory Reform and its staff met in Washington with representatives and officials
of federal agencies involved in the regulation of interstate surface transportation. In recognition of the complexity of economic issues subsumed within the
debate and most committee members' lack of academic economic background,
this series of meetings was scheduled to acquaint members with the framework
of analysis that had evolved at the federal level for measuring the adequacy of
27. See Letter from Project Director to Committee on Regulatory Reform Chairman
Sheldon (July 24, 1979) (accompanying study).
28. Hearings conducted by the Public Service Commission during 1979 in preparation for
sunset review of its regulatory functions included:
July 3 - Written comments due from all affected parties.
July 17 - Tallahassee - Public Hearing on Electric and Gas Regulation.
July 18 - Tallahassee - Public Hearing on Telephone, Telegraph, and RCC Regulation.
July 19 - Tallahassee - Public Hearing on Water and Sewer Regulation.
July 20 - Tallahassee - Public Hearing on Transportation Brokers and Freightforward Regulation.
July 24 - St. Petersburg - Public Hearing on Statutory Revisions.
July 25 - Tampa - Public Hearings on Statutory Revisions.
July 26 - Tampa - Public Hearing on Statutory Revisions.
July 27 - Orlando - Public Hearing on Statutory Revisions.
August 1 - Jacksonville - Public Hearing on Statutory Revisions.
August 2 - Miami - Public Hearing on Statutory Revisions.
August 3- Pensacola - Public Hearing on Statutory Revisions.
29.

COMIMITTEE ON REGULATORY REFORM, FINAL REPORT 4 (1980).
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transportation regulation. Additionally, meetings with members of the Interstate Commerce Commission and staffs of the Department of Transportation,
Department of Agriculture and Senate Judiciary Committee served to illuminate for participants the issues and arguments.
Because federal consideration of regulatory reform had been progressing for
some time 30 previous to regulatory reform review in Florida, the series of
Washington conferences provided the committee access to considerable data
generated by the federal agencies. This information provided a valuable
foundation for the sunset inquiry. A substantial number of questions posed by
the committee's questionnaire to the PSC resulted directly from information
generated during the Washington meetings.
As a result of the Washington discussions and research conducted up to
that time, essential issues tentatively defined for consideration in the review of
surface transportation were:
1. entry - including the rationale for requiring certificates of public convenience and
necessity and for imposing the burden of proof on the
31

applicant;

2. rates- including the legality of intrastate rate bureaus and the PSC

procedures in the review and approval of rate submissions;
3. restrictions- including energy and other economic considerations;3 2

4. safety; and
5. the common carrierobligation and small town service - focusing particularly on enforcement of the common carrier obligation and the
extent to which small town service depended upon a regulated transportation system.
Based on the tentative definition of issues, the House Committee on Regulatory Reform began formulating a schedule of hearings designed to provide a
foundation for analyzing whether to continue reform or repeal regulation of
surface transportation. It was evident that prior to consideration of particular
80. Reform proposals pending before Congress included S. 1400 (Trucking Competition
and Safety Act of 1979), S. 2245 (Motor Carrier Reform Act of 1980), and H.R. 6418 (Motor

Carrier Act of 1980).
31. To qualify for issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity, the burden
was on the applicant to demonstrate: (1) that there was a need for the service; (2) that the
applicant was fit, willing, and able to provide that service; (3) that the applicant would not

harm already existing carriers; and (4) that existing carriers had failed or were unable to
supply the proposed service. Each application for a new certificate had to be accompanied by

a filing fee of $500; a $100 filing fee was required for applications to expand existing operations.

32. The most commonly employed restrictions were: (1) area restrictions, which limited
the carrier's operations to a particular area of the state; (2) "closed door" restrictions, which
allowed the carrier to service shippers at the end points in his route, but not to provide service

at points along that route; (3) "one way" restrictions,which allowed a carrier to take cargo
to a given location, but prevented him from returning with any; (4) vehicle restrictions,which
limited the type, size, and number of vehicles used by a carrier; and (5) commodity restrictions, or limitations on the types of goods that could be hauled. A catalogue of examples of
restrictions imposed upon operating authority may be found in the special report of the Committee on Regulatory Reform relating to surface transportation.
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reform proposals, the committee needed to attain a broad understanding of the
economic and legal issues to be presented in the reform debate.
On September 20 and 21, 1979, the first extensive meeting was held in which
an examination of issues and precedents relevant to surface transportation
regulation was conducted by the committee. The majority of this two-day
hearing was devoted to definition of issues relating to the economic rationale
of regulation. Information on trucking deregulation was gathered from video
34
tape documentaries 33 as well as testimony from witnesses. Further, because
many of the arguments articulated by industry representatives mirrored those
of the airline industry prior to congressional deregulation of air transportation,
the chairman thought it worthwhile to examine the experience of airlines in35
their anticipation and implementation of deregulation. This diverse inquiry
provided the committee needed perspective with which to begin its evaluation
process.3 6
33. The committee took the novel approach of viewing videotape documentaries produced
for public viewing in the "60 Minutes," "The Advocates" and "Congressional Outlook" series.
It was anticipated and demonstrated that well-produced and researched video presentations
would not only expedite committee understanding of the issues but also allow the members
of the committee to evaluate first hand the arguments of leading participants in the surface
transportation debate not otherwise available as live winesses.
34. Witnesses appearing included Mr. Ernie T. Litz, project director of the committeecommissioned issues study prepared by the Florida State University Department of Public
Administration; Mr. Daniel Klein, senior planning economist Eastern Airlines, Miami, Florida;
Mr. Edward Tempest of the Auditor General's Office, senior auditor assigned to preparation
of Audit #9349, dated November 2, 1978, a "Performance Audit of the State Program for
Motor Carrier Regulation;" Dr. Milton Kafoglis, Chairman of the Department of Economics
and John Harland, Professor of Economics, Emory University, and former member of the
Council on Wage and Price Stability; Mr. Jack Pearce, a Washington, D.C. based attorney
representing a consortium of major shippers; and, Dr. James C. Miller, Co-Director and
Resident Scholar, the Center for the Study of Government Regulation, American Enterprise
Institute, Washington, D.C., and former member of the Council on Wage and Price Stability.
Testimony from the audience at the September 20-21 hearings was not allowed. This
provoked a strong reaction from the Florida Trucking Association and its representatives.
The association sent a letter to all house members charging that the committee had prejudged the issues and had denied the industry its opportunity to be heard prior to formulation of their position.
35. For an example of one of the many views presented, see OrIcE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA; PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE STATE PROGRAM FOR MOTOR CARRIER
REGULATION, (November 2, 1978) [hereinafter cited as AUDITOR GENERAL'S REPORT]. This audit
concludes that "economic regulation of the motor carrier industry is only marginally effective
and fosters economic inefficiency in the transportation system. Transportation services to FlorThe
ida's citizens would not be adversely affected by deregulating most of the industry ....
economic
by
caused
pricing
cartel
state-sanctioned
of
form
the
in
costs
public bears unnecessary
regulation of those segments of the motor carrier industry that are naturally competitive.
Their prices and services would be more effectively regulated by the free market." Id. at 13.
The only form of economic regulation the Auditor General retained related to motor
carriers providing less than truckload consolidation services. Id. at 38.
36. The majority of this two-day hearing was devoted to definition of issues relating to
the economic rationale of regulation, and questions and answers related thereto. Perhaps the
most heated exchange of the two days occurred in dialogue between Mr. Edward Tempest of
the Auditor General's Office and Representative C. Fred Jones. The methodology and assumptions of the Auditor General in reaching its conclusion that all trucking in Florida, other than
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The broad agenda of the September 20-21 hearing forced the committee to
operate on a tightly structured schedule. As announced at the outset of the
hearing, all interested individuals were to be afforded ample opportunity to
present their viewpoint at an appropriate time. The committee, however, was
firmly committed to the orderly development of issues prior to opening the
committee process to industry advocacy. This structured approach to the hearings was necessitated by the number of regulatory programs to be addressed
and was consistent with the Regulatory Reform Act's placement of the burden
of proof on those who advocate the continuation of regulation. Additionally,
this approach recognized that industry advocates would work informally to
apprise legislators of the industry's position.
LEGISLATIVE DEBATE: PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION

Although trucking was the predominant political issue in the surface transportation debate, the committee also undertook examination of bus and taxi
regulation. These two modes of transportation were regulated by the PSC
pursuant to the same statutory authority as in the case of trucking. 7 Because
Florida has a tourist-based economy, a well-developed system of passenger
transportation is a necessity. Therefore, when the committee became aware of
significant problems regarding the availability and adequacy of regulated
passenger transportation services, this area became one of major concern.
On January 50, 1980, in conjunction with the Committee on Tourism and
Economic Development, joint hearings relating to regulation of passenger
transportation were conducted in Orlando. Contrary opinions were expressed
by representatives of the bus industry as to the need for continued regulation.
The Florida Association of Competitive Passenger Carriers38 urged the legislature to terminate economic regulation of motor carriers, while the Florida
Motor Passenger Transportation Association- 9 advocated continuation of extensive state regulation. At the same time, the consumer witnesses made it clear
that under the present system there existed problems of quality and availability
of charter and tour bus service.

The hearings also uncovered regulation problems in the charter bus industry. Tour operators throughout the state opined that charter bus service in
Florida was totally unsatisfactory, and as a result Florida was in danger of

losing the business of foreign tourists.40 Managers from several of Florida's
"less than truckload," should be deregulated, was challenged by Mr. Jones as ignoring the
issue of economic protection of Florida's truckers from the seasonal influx of "snowbirds."
This issue, which was not often publicly debated, did linger just below the surface throughout much of the committee's deliberations. Mr. Jones argued that the state had a legitimate
interest to protect by checking the seasonal flooding of the market.
87.

See FLA. STAT. §323.01(7) (1979).

38. Florida Association of Competitive Passenger Carriers, P.O. Box 15830, Orlando, Fla.

82858.
39. Florida Motor Passenger Transportation Association P.O. Box 431160, Miami, Fla.
3143.
40. Hearings on FLA. STAT. §323, Before the House Committee on Regulatory Reform and
the House Committee on Tourism and Economic Development (Jan. 80, 1980) (statements by
Latin American Tour Operators Association; Instant World, Inc.; ABC Tours; Both World
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largest tourist attractions41 testified that the restrictions on charter operations
greatly reduced the availability of bus transportation to their facilities. Representatives of the American Association for Retired Persons concurred with the
opinion, based on their experiences with the existing system, that the bus
industry should be opened up to competition.42 Senior citizen trips to bowling
alleys and movie theaters, for example, were being cancelled only hours before
their scheduled departure.
Testimony was offered by a Florida Department of Commerce spokesman to
the effect that the PSC had created a widening gap between supply and demand
by not permitting the number of charter buses to expand with the growing influx of Florida's tourists. According to the department, restrictive entry regulations prevented eager entrepreneurs from meeting this burgeoning demand.
Data developed by the committee tended to confirm this view point.
Reform efforts were spurred on by a newspaper story that appeared during
the legislative session. It reported on the efforts of an entrepreneur in the small
city of Perry, Florida, to obtain PSC permission to provide state employees
commuter service to Tallahassee, some 53 miles away. Both Trailways and
Greyhound, whose rates more than doubled those proposed by the applicant,
protested the application even though their buses were not accessible to these
commuters at times convenient to state office hours. 43 Public outrage ensued
and government interference was again portrayed as over-protecting the interests of the large carriers while stifling the entrepreneurial aspirations of small
businessmen.
From the outset, the committee's discussion of motor carrier regulation had
centered upon two issues: entry-control and rate-setting. The evidence uncovered provoked considerable concern in the minds of many members of the
committee. Possession of a certificate for regular route passenger service was
found to be a requirement for holding charter bus authority. Charter service
could only originate from a point where the carrier had regular route authority.
Entry into the intrastate bus industry was often a long and arduous task,
requiring acquisition of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. As
was the case with trucking, an applicant for such a certificate had the burden
of proving:
Tours; Florida International Tour Operators, Inc.; Festival Tours; Globetrotter of Scandinavia; Tours Spectacular; Green Travel; BTM Travel Group Bramer Tours; Lindo's Tours).
41. Florida Attraction Association; Silver Springs Attraction; Seaworld.
42. Hearings on FLA. STAT. §323, Before the House Committee on Regulatory Reform
and the House Committee on Tourism and Economic Development (Jan. 30, 1980) (statements by Doris Smith, Ester Morgan, and Alberta Weller).
43. The applicant, Mr. Henry Browning proposed to operate two 15 passenger vans between Perry and Tallahassee each week day. The market for his proposed service consisted
of some 100 Perry residents who daily commuted the 106 mile round trip. Mr. Browning
proposed a fare of $68 per month ($72 per month if paid one week at a time) as compared
to $162 per month charged by Greyhound and $129 per month charged by Trailways.
Browning's proposed schedule was to be consistent with the 8 AM-5 PM state office work day.
Greyhound provided regularly scheduled service from Perry to Tallahassee departing at
4:10 and 11:17 AM; Trailways service departed Perry at 6:45 AM. Both companies return
service departed Tallahassee at 4 and 8:30 PM.
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1. the applicant was fit, willing and able to provide the proposed transportation;
2. there was a need for the proposed service;
3. allowing such service would not harm existing carriers; and,
4. existing carriers failed or were unable to provide the service.
The PSO's strict interpretation of these standards, coupled with the extreme
difficulty experienced by many applicants in finding competent witnesses to
support their application, resulted in no certificates being issued unless a determination was made that existing service was inadequate. Even a demonstration of immediate and urgent need for charter service would not suffice unless
4
regular route authority was attached. "
Furthermore, more than eighty percent of new applications were protested,
insuring a long and drawn-out process. Faced with these hurdles, applicants
were encouraged to negotiate with protestants. In return for withdrawing its
protest, a protestant often persuaded an applicant to amend the request for
authority by removing those parts which would permit the applicant to compete
with the protestant. A south Florida applicant, for example, was granted
authority to transport workers only after amending his request to provide that
his buses would lack air conditioning and rest room facilities.45
An alternative means of obtaining operating authority was to merge with
or purchase, in part or whole, an existing carrier's certificate. Operating
rights, however, were extremely expensive to obtain, particularly on lucrative routes which could support additional carriers. In 1977, a single regular
route from Miami to Hollywood was sold for nearly $200,000, exclusive of
any equipment. 46 Several touring and sightseeing routes from Volusia County
to sporting events in other parts of the state and to Disney World were sold in
1977 for $250,000, also apart from any equipment.47 These high sales prices
were conclusive evidence of excessive profits. In the evolving view of a majority
of the committee, the intrinsic value of the certificate authority was based upon
the expectation of realizing above normal profits by operating in markets that
were effectively insulated from competition.
The entry-controlling procedures acted to effectively cap the number of bus
companies in Florida. An examination of the passenger bus industry in California revealed 884 carriers with charter or regular route authority compared
to 35 in Florida. This data translated to one carrier for every 30,000 Californiani, compared to one carrier for every 220,000 Floridians.48
Examination of rate regulation under the PSC raised equally serious questions concerning its operation in the public interest. Collectively set rates
by passenger motor carriers denied consumers the benefit of competitive pric44. Examples of the difficulties encountered in applying for a certificate were plentiful.

For instance, one central Florida resident endured 44 hours of hearings and expended $30,000
in legal and accounting fees, only to end up with a meager 8 mile route. See affidavit of Gary
D. Malfield, filed with the Committee on Regulatory Reform (April 14, 1980).
45. See AUDITOR GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 35, at 43.

46. Id. at 131.
47. Id. at 70.
48. Id. at 71.
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ing. Further, stipulated prices foreclosed the opportunity for management to
establish rates consistent with sound business decision making.
In his testimony before the committee on September 20, 1979, Dr. Milton
Kafogolis argued that regulated rates were ten to twenty percent higher than
those charged in unregulated markets. Although Dr. Kafogolis was referring to
trucking rates, no evidence was subsequently adduced to indicate that rates for
passenger carriage were not also artificially supported by rate regulation.
Speaking in more general terms, Dr. Kafogolis stated:
[I]t is alleged that (rate) regulation eliminates price discrimination.
Price discrimination means charging a higher price to one customer than
to another for substantially the same service. Only a monopolist can do
this; if there is competition, a competitor will reduce rates for the customer that is being charged the high rate and in this way price differences will be minimized. Competition, not regulation, eliminates price
discrimination. 9
More fundamentally, rate regulation created incentives for regulated motor
carriers to increase costs, not reduce them. Cost-plus rate setting and the virtual
absence of price competition did not encourage efficient operations.
The regulatory system itself discouraged carriers from charging rates which
accurately reflected market conditions. A carrier who in good faith wished to
set rates at a competitive, cost-based level was encumbered by the time consuming requirement of securing PSC approval. Although a carrier's rate proposal was economically realistic at the time it was docketed, it might fail to
reflect actual market conditions or the carrier's costs by the time it received
approval. The cost of applying for a rate change created a further disincentive.5
Thus, the regulatory system prevented carriers' spontaneous responses to changing market conditions.
In sum, the committee's investigation of entry-control and rate-setting failed
to unearth evidence that the public health, safety and welfare would be substantially harmed in the absence of such economic regulation. To the contrary,
most information tended to refute many of the contentions alleging economic
regulation to be in the public interest.
THE TRUCKING DEREGULATION DEBATE

Contemporaneous with completion of the first round of hearings, the Committee on Regulatory Reform staff began to receive and analyze PSC responses
to the committee's questionnaire. Consisting of some eighty questions, the
questionnaire was designed to elicit a thorough statement of the PSC's understanding of the scope of its authority and responsibilities. Additionally, statistical and economic data were sought to aid the committee in assessing the
49. Hearings on FLA. STAT. ch. 323, Before the House Committee on Regulatory Reform
(Sept. 20, 1979) (statement by Dr. Milton Kafoglis).
50. Rate changes could cost up to $100,000. Hearings on FLA. STAT. ch. 323, Before the
House Committee on Regulatory Reform (April 7, 1980) (statement by Florida Trucking
Association).
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quality of regulatory efforts and the degree to which regulation comported with
current public needs.
Analysis of those responses revealed that the PSC relied largely, and in some
cases exclusively, upon information provided by industry in making regulatory
decisions. In 1978, for example, the PSC set rates for general commodity freight
based on the operating ratios, intrastate revenue and expenses, and profit
figures of only six out of fifty-seven certified carriers. 1 Although the PSG was
statutorily required to review and approve rates filed with it, data supplied by
the PSO indicated that, in 1978, of 186 rate organization tariff filings only six
(three percent) were independently investigated; of 259 independently filed
tariff charges filed in 1978 only four (1.5 percent) were independently investigated.52
During the debate the trucking industry repeatedly argued that small town
service was unprofitable and could be continued only under traditional regulation. The PSC was unable to supply data that would support the industry's
position when requested in the committee's questionnaire to supply such information.
In explaining the application procedure for obtaining a certificate of public
convenience and necessity, the PSG detailed a seventy-eight step application
and evaluation process, irrespective of appeals, that was routinely followed. "
Also, witnesses who had previously applied to the PSG for certificates testified
they had spent two or more years and many thousands of dollars seeking entry
to the field, only to be denied full authority or forced to compromise the application to effect protest withdrawals. This evidence prompted the committee
to begin defining the burden of proof that advocates of regulation would be
required to meet if regulation was to be continued.
Preliminary expressions of committee sentiment for deregulation were
bolstered by the disclosure of statistics collected in a study conducted at the
University of Florida focusing on the issue of back-haul restriction.- Based on
interviews with truckers and random samplings at highway inspection and
weight stations, researchers concluded that at any given time approximately
thirty percent of the trucks on Florida's roads were running empty. Thus,
annual operation of this regulation, purportedly in the public interest, resulted
in over 50,000,000 empty road miles and the non-productive consumption of
approximately 15.6 million gallons of diesel fuel. Advocates for regulation responded that relaxing entry restrictions would put additional trucks on the
highways and thereby increase consumption of fuel, but no evidence substantiating this claim was presented. In light of the prevailing legislative sensitivity
to the issue of energy shortages, the cumulative weight of this and earlier de51. The cost of rate change applications as exemplified by the testimony of the Florida
Intrastate Rate Bureau, which estimated annual expenditures of $100,000 on rate case alone.
52. Response to question #16, House Committee on Regulatory Reform Questionnaire to
Public Service Commission.
53. Response to question #31, House Committee on Regulatory Reform Questionnaire to
Public Service Commission.
54. Response to question #14, House Committee on Regulatory Reform Questionnaire to
Public Service Commission.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 5 [1980], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXHI

scribed evidence only raised the level of proof which advocvates of continued
regulation had to satisfy.
While considerable support for outright deregulation was expressed early
in the process, substantial sentiment existed in favor of maintaining residual
safety authority either in the PSC, which had markedly improved its safety
program in recent years, or in some other appropriate agency. There was also
apprehension concerning the impact that deregulation would have on Florida's
transportation industry. Opinions varied from the extreme prediction of blood
on the highways, to predictions that an overflow of trucks on the road would
preclude economical operation. It was also feared that established firms would
act in a predatory manner to consolidate market power and reduce the number
of competitors, thereby creating a shared monopoly. 55 In reality, economic projections and market models notwithstanding, it was not possible to argue persuasively in favor of either result because there was no experiential frame of
reference.
The antitrust issues inherent in the deregulation debate also were considered
by the committee. Concerns expressed by those within the industry and the
legislature prompted hearings in mid-March on these issues. Specifically, questions were posed about the legality of interstate rate bureaus, a practice discussed at length in an attorney general's opinion. 56
That opinion cast substantial doubt on the propriety of operating intrastate rate bureaus. It relied on specific statutory language in the existing state
antitrust provisions, 57 which prohibited any act or combination by any person
or persons the purpose of which was "to prevent competition in the ...transportation... of merchandise, produce or commodities."58 The opinion noted
that as a general rule exceptions to antitrust prohibitions were not to be implied lightly. In addition, authorization for legal operation of interstate rate
bureaus was based upon an explicit exemption from antitrust law. 59
There were also potential federal antitrust problems. A recent district court
opinion, United States v. Southern Motor CarriersRate Conference,6o held that
the intrastate rate making activities of rate bureaus were not insulated from
prosecution under the Sherman Act. To clarify the issue the committee heard
testimony from several expert witnesses. 61 These witnesses, however, could not
agree on whether Southern Motor Carriersapplied to the Florida situation.
55.
56.

See T. Maze, Supply of Florida Produce Hauling Truck Service (1980).
Op. ATr'y GEN. FrA. 078-53 (1978).
FLA.STAT. §542.05 (1979).

57.
58. Id. §542.05(l)(c).

59. 49 U.S.C. 5 (1976).
60. 467 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
61. The committee heard testimony of Mr. William Bryant, section chief of the Florida
Attorney General's Antitrust Unit, Mr. Eliot Seiden, chief of the United States Department of
Justice Antitrust Division's Transportation Section, Mr. J.F. Brookshier, chief of Tariff Bureaus
for five of Florida's ten intrastate rate bureaus and Mr. James Wharton, attorney representing
the Florida Intrastate Rate Bureau before the committee. Mr. Bryant recounted the evolution
of the antitrust law relating to rate bureaus and spoke in generalized terms about the possible
response of state and federal law to various situations which might arise in an unregulated
market. Mr. Seiden testified that the rule of the Southern Motor Carriers Rate Case was directly applicable to the situation extant in Florida and that, upon conclusion of the appeal
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Another factor that was important to the committee was the attitude of
small business. Evidence of his attitude was collected by the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), a national organization of small businesses with more than 20,000 Florida members. This organization had recently
completed an opinion survey on issues expected to come before the Florida
Legislature in 1980. Copies of the ballot were delivered to each representative
and senator on the eve of the 1980 session. Among the questions posed to the
membership was "should the intrastate trucking industry in Florida be deregulated?" Based on a return of approximately fourteen percent of ballots
distributed, a response considered sufficient for purposes of statistical verifiability, sixty-seven percent favored deregulation, nineteen percent opposed it,
and fourteen percent were undecided or had no opinion.
These polling results stood in marked contrast to representations made by
industry advocates to the effect that small business favored continued regulation. The results of the NFIB poll were particularly interesting when viewed
in relation to a 1979 national poll of its members. In the earlier poll a less substantial majority, fifty-two percent, voiced a preference for deregulation when
the same question was posed. This measurably stronger sentiment for deregulation expressed by Florida business generated substantial momentum for major
reform.
On the day these results were announced, April 7th, the Committee on
Regulatory Reform convened for the purpose of eliciting industry opinion.
After PSC officials briefly answered committee member questions concerning

the issues of safety regulation and PSC procedure for analysis of tariff filings,
industry representatives argued that America's transportation was the world's
best. The industry maintained that this was a result of a carefully constructed
and controlled regulatory environment. The truckers also argued what had
become something of a catch-phrase for the industry, "If it ain't broke, don't
fixit."
Questions fr-om committee members focused largely on the small-town
service issue. Considerable conflict appeared between the testimony of industry
spokesmen and small-town shippers and receivers. The industry contended
small-town service was an economic loser and was continued merely to meet
the common carrier obligation imposed by the regulatory scheme. On the
other hand, small-town shippers and receivers asserted that small-town service,
although within the carriers' authority, was in many instances currently un-

available. Industry testimony also appeared at variance with the record of such
highly profitable carriers as United Parcel Service and Yellow Freight, which
had developed their operations on small town, small package service.
of that case to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Justice Department would review the need to institute proceedings in Florida to assure compliance with that legal standard.

Mr. Brookshier testified that there would be chaos in the industries should carriers be
precluded from establishing uniform rates for carriage of similar commodities between
identical points and that the operation of rate bureaus served the best interests of the shipping
and consuming public. Mr. Wharton took exception to the analysis of Mr. Seiden with regard
to applicability to the Florida situation of the rule of Southern Motor CarrierRate Case and
further argued that industry historically had been mandated to file rates uniformly and
were, thereby, only complying with the state's administrative authority.
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In the aftermath of the April 7 meeting, it became obvious that a solid
majority of the committee favpred either outright and immediate deregulation
or a phase-out of regulation over a definite time period. This later option was
advocated by the committee staff; it was their judgment that opening entry
while retaining temporary rate control was the best public policy. Gradual extinguishment of regulation would allow new competitors to enter and establish
themselves in the market free of the arduous task of certification and without
the operating limitations imposed by existing regulation. Rates would then be
fully deregulated after an eighteen month period. This phasing out of rate
regulation, it was believed, would enable new entrants to establish a market
foothold without confronting a potentially volatile pricing situation.
As the Regulatory Reform Committee staff developed reform options, the
Senate Commerce Committee, the senate counterpart of the Regulatory Reform
Committee, proceeded to consider its proposed bill. The bill favorably reported
by the Commerce Committee proposed modest reforms but left the regulation
system essentially intact. The Regulatory Reform Committee used the senate
bill and the proposal of the PSC as a reference point upon which it could
focus in fashioning its proposal.
Neither the majority of the committee favoring major reform nor the staff
questioned the ability of the surface transportation industry to operate successfully in a free and competitive market. Considerable concern, however, had
arisen over the potential for major firms to destroy fledgling competition by
the selective exercise of existing market power. It was feared that new competition would be thwarted by their driving prices below cost in some areas
while subsidizing this loss by price increases in other areas. Though such conduct would clearly constitute a violation of traditional antitrust standards,
Florida's antitrust statute62 was generally perceived to be an ineffective enforcement weapon. 63 Therefore, some residual control of pricing during the "evening-out" process caused by opening of entry was believed essential.
Additional concern was prompted by the persistent rumor that if Florida
deregulated intrastate trucking, thereby becoming the first state to take such
action, national interests favoring continued regulation would adopt a "lose
the battle but win the war" approach and move to insure the failure of deregulation in Florida. By intentionally interfering with the industry's adjustments to natural market conditions, it was entirely possible that a chaotic situation could be stimulated. This result would build support for industry arguments and blunt the impetus for similar reform in other states and at the federal level.
LEGISLATIVE

ACrION

Entering the session on April 8, it was widely perceived that the house and
senate would adopt completely divergent positions with regard to the issue of
surface transportation regulation. The modest amendments contained in the
62.

FLA. STAT. §§543.02-.13 (1979).

63. At this point in the 1980 legislative session there was no guarantee that the efforts of
the Attorney General to reform FLA. STAT. §§542.01-.13 would be successful. However, chapter
542 was successfully revised by the 1980 Legislature. See 1980 Fla. Laws, ch. 80-28.
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Senate Commerce Committee proposal were correctly perceived as being
radically different from the approach anticipated to emanate from the house.
It was generally agreed the two dramatically divergent approaches would not
be reconciled, if at all, until convening of a conference committee late in the
session.
In the face of an intensive and well-directed lobbying effort by the Florida
Association of Competitive Passenger Carriers, a coalition of relatively small
tour bus companies, sufficient votes were garnered early in the Senate's deliberation on the Commerce Committee Bill to push through an amendment opening entry in the limited area of passenger transportation. With the door opened
this far, a spirited floor fight was launched, which, in a matter of two hours,
resulted in the adoption of three dozen major amendments that effectively deregulated the industry.
With an unacceptable bill coming out of the senate, industry advocates
were confronted with a far different situation than they had anticipated.
Barring a reversal by the full senate on the bill's final reading, industry spokesmen were faced with acceptance of the house version or the prospect of
sunset and a totally deregulated market. It was at this point in time that advocates for the industry first appeared favorable to deregulation, although this
position may have been mere posturing.
Because the dynamics of the legislative process had been altered so dramatically, attention focused again on the House Committee on Regulatory
Reform and the release of its reform package. While the "phase-out" approach,
as previously described, was tentatively considered by the leadership as the
most appropriate approach to reform advocates for outright deregulation
urged the committee to end the debate quickly and report that there would be
no house bill. Adoption of this suggestion would have put the industry in the
uncomfortable position of having to advocate house adoption of a bill which
it opposed, trying to make needed amendments on the floor. Alternatively, the
industry could have attempted to kill the senate bill and thereby guarantee the
result it most wanted to avoid: deregulation and a wide open market.
After consideration of available options, it was decided to pursue the
original course of action and present the phase-out proposal to the committee.
The proposal was reported favorably by the committee with virtually no amendments and was sent up for consideration to the full house.64 Prior to floor debate of the issue, an informal conference was held with representatives of
the industry and the house leadership. During the discussion the trucking
industry argued that the section of the bill dealing with rates, allowing a band
within which rates must remain, was unacceptable to the industry. Additionally,
the industry felt that the bill required some restrictions to keep out-of-state
companies from entering the state and cutting prices below that which Floridabased companies could profitably charge. These discussions resulted in several
amendments which were adopted on the floor with the understanding that the
only remaining issue to be negotiated with the senate concerned the rate provisions.
64. Fla. H.R. 1635 (Reg. Sess. 1980).
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This bill was passed by the house by an overwhelming vote and went on to
the senate for consideration. In the Senate Commerce Committee, however,
many of the industry backed proposals concerning entry, rates and routes were
reintroduced into the bill. This addition caused negotiations between the
house and the senate to break down.
In the closing days of the legislative session, with a deadlock between the
two houses of the legislature apparent, the Speaker of the House met informally
with the leaders of the trucking lobby. He indicated that it would be necessary
for the industry to accept modification of the senate's position. Otherwise, the
house would take no action. The result would be a sunsetting of the entire
state trucking regulatory scheme. The industry indicated that they would
prefer total deregulation over the phase-out proposal developed by the House
Committee on Regulatory Reform. Accordingly, the Speaker accepted this reaction as a final chapter in the legislative battle and informed members of the
house leadership that the issue had been resolved for the 1980 legislative session,
and that the house would not report out a bill. Regulation of surface transportation would be sunsetted.
SAFETY REGULATION

Once it was determined that economic regulation of the surface transportation industry would expire on July 1, 1980, the critically important consideration of continued safety regulation remained to be resolved. Widespread legislative support for reestablished safety regulation was perceived by the industry
as possibly providing leverage to salvage economic regulation.
The necessity for adequate safety regulation of motor vehicles and drivers
was accepted by all parties involved in the legislative negotiations. Questions
arose, however, as to the past effectiveness of the safety program. Data gathered
in the early stages of the hearings process indicated that emphasis was often
placed on inspecting vehicles to insure the driver possessed the proper certificate
for the route traveled and commodities carried, rather than inspecting the
actual physical condition of the vehicle or driver for safety of operation. No
one questioned, however, the need to protect the public from unsafe vehicles
and drivers.
Proponents of continued economic regulation claimed that highway safety
would deteriorate without pervasive economic regulation. They contended that
without economic regulation the PSC, or a successor agency, would not have
the muscle to enforce safety standards. Nonetheless, the Committee on Regulatory Reform determined that economic and safety regulation were totally
distinct and legally severable policies and procedures. On the federal level both
airline and trucking regulation distinguish between economic and safety functions.
Various safety proposals were considered by the house. One such proposal
left safety enforcement under the PSC. 5 On June 4, 1980, the house passed this
proposed bill by a vote of 92 to 2. On reference to the senate, the bill died in
the Senate Committee on Rules and Calendar.
65.

Fla. H.R. 1869 (Reg. Sess. 1980).
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On June 7, 1980, the final day of the regular legislative session, the house
6
passed another bill as a final attempt to retain some form of safety regulation.
The original intent of this proposal was only to grant Dade County preemptive
authority (over the municipalities in Dade County) to regulate taxicabs. As an
available vehicle to retain safety jurisdiction, the bill was amended to include a
transfer of authority for safety inspection and personnel from the PSC to the
Florida Department of Transportation. The senate again failed to respond to
this initiative, and the regular session ended without the enactment of any legislation providing for continued safety inspection.
The next attempt to continue safety inspection centered on the possibility
of transferring PSG personnel and funding to the United States Department of
Transportation. This department in theory had authority over highway safety,
but in practice lacked the fiscal and physical resources to adequately perform
the task. 7 Under the provisions of the sunset law, funding for all personnel and
functions was continued for one year, although no authority was granted to
actually carry out any task should the statute not be reestablished. The possibility of an executive transfer of PSG personnel, equipment and funding to the

United States Department of Transportation was investigated but as a result
of the special session called by the governor, no such decision was reached.
During the special session of the legislature,6 a bill to re-establish a safety
program was introduced in the senate.69 This bill consolidated weight and
safety inspections by transferring employees of the PSC engaged in safety inspections and employees of the Florida Highway Patrol engaged in weight inspection to the Florida Department of Transportation. The bill passed both
houses and was signed into law on July 1, 1980.
CONCLUSION

Florida thus became the first governmental entity to move from an extensively regulated economic environment for surface transportation to one essentially devoid of regulation of rates, routes or commodities which may be
carried. In so doing, the legislature demonstrated that it could withstand extreme pressure from well-entrenched interest groups and advanced the cause of
an accountable government. Retrospective analysis of Florida's sunset review
experience gives cause for optimism that a "surgical" approach to reform,
emphasizing case-by-case analysis and reform of existing programs, can prevail
over the "meat-ax" approach of across-the-board budget and personnel cuts.
The latter course is merely a reaction to the public dissatisfaction with the cost
and size of government. It is not necessarily responsive to the public's need for
ongoing government involvement in specific areas to assure to all a minimum
of opportunity and a reasonable quality of life.

66. Fla. H.R. 39 (Reg. Sess. 1980).
67. It was determined that in Florida there were four United States Department of
Transportation officials monitoring various aspects of surface transportation.
68. Fla. S. 15-D (Spec. Sess. 1980).
69. 1980 Fla. Laws, ch. 80-298.
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